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Taxation: Disclaimers Under Federal and
Minnesota Law
I.

INTRODUCTION

A disclaimer is an affirmative act, declaration, or document
by which a person refuses to accept a beneficial interest offered
or imputed to him. An effective disclaimer prevents title to the
interest disclaimed from vesting in the disclaimant, thus allow-

ing the disclaimant to release his right to the interest without
making a transfer.'
Under present law the validity of an attempted disclaimer is
determinative of tax consequences. 2 An effective disclaimer allows a disclaimant to release his right to an interest, thus permitting the interest to pass to the person entitled to take in the
event of disclaimer, without producing a taxable event.3 However, if a purported disclaimer is ineffective, the act of disclaiming becomes a gratuitous transfer subject to the gift tax.4 Thus,
two taxes are imposed-an estate or gift tax when the interest
is created and a gift tax resulting from the attempted disclaimer.
Similarly, two taxes may be imposed if a disclaimant dies within
three years of an ineffective disclaimer. In such a case the act
of disclaiming is subject to attack as a transfer made in contemplation of death and the value of the interest may be included in the disclaimant's gross estate. 5 Consequently, there
would be one tax at creation of the interest and another at the
disclaimant's death. 6
1. "Disclaimer" is synonymcus with "renunciation." See 1 ABBOTT,
(1879); 2 id. 408; BLACK, LAW

DICTIONARY OF TERms AND PHRASES 382

DICTIONARY 550, 1462 (4th ed. 1951); 12A WORDS

AND

PHRASES 272 (1954);

36A id. 705 (1962).
2. See notes 23-24 infra and accompanying text.
3. E.g., Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933). See
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2511(a), 2035(a); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)
(1958); 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL GiFT & ESTATE TAXATION § 14.04, at p. 94
(1959); 5 id. 67-80 [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
4. Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); Kathryn S. Fuller, 37 T.C. 147 (1961);
William J. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)
(1958).

See INT.

.2V.

CODE OF

1954,

§ 2511(a).

5. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035(a), (b).
6. The validity of an attempted disclaimer in a state with an
inheritance tax poses an additional problem. An effective disclaimer
shifts the inheritance tax liability to the person taking as a result of the
disclaimer. This may affect the amount of the tax because the tax rate
in most states varies with the relationship the taker of the interest has
to the decedent.
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SHOULD DISCLAIMERS BE GIVEN TAX EFFECT?

It has been argued that it would be unconstitutional to tax
the act of disclaiming as a transfer.7 However, it is well settled that the power to control the ultimate disposition of property is a sufficient basis for imposition of a transfer tax.8 Under
income tax laws, for example, there is a tax on the right to receive income even though there is no actual receiptY Consequently a disclaimant's control over the ultimate disposition of
the property would seem constitutionally sufficient to support a
tax, despite the fact that his control is limited to a choice between taking the property or allowing it to pass to those who
take as a result of his disclaimer.' 0
The traditional argument for allowing tax-insulated disclaimers is that a person should not be forced to accept property
with the concomitant burdens and responsibilities inherent in
ownership. Therefore, he should have the right of rejection
without being subject to a gift tax liability." Since any tax
on a disclaimer would have to be predicated on control over the
property rather than enjoyment or possession, it is arguably unfair to predicate tax liability on control limited to the choice of
accepting an interest or allowing it to pass to those entitled to
7. See Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1942);
Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1940); Lasser, The Tax
Clinic, 96 J. Accountancy 350 (1953) (the right to refuse property is as
much a part of our liberty as the right to own property); Roehner &
Roehner, Renunciation as Taxable Gift-An Unconstitutional Federal
Tax Decision, 8 TAx L. REV. 289 (1953) (inconsistency between income
and gift tax results dictates a conclusion of unconstitutionality). But
clearly there is no constitutional requirement that the income tax and
gift tax law be consistent.
8. See Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 353 (1945): "It [Congress] may tax the exercise, non-exercise, or relinquishment of a power
of disposition of property, where other important indicia of ownership
are lacking." See, e.g., Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933);
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038 (power to control beneficiaries of a trust);
id. § 2041 (a) (2) (general power of appointment taxed even when not

exercised).
9. E.g., Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); Loose v. United
States, 74 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1934); J. D. Amend, 13 T.C. 178 (1949).
10. See ALI, FED. INCOME, EsTATE, taND GIFT TAx STAT. § X1007 (h)
at 39 (April 1956 Draft).
The usual basis for attacking the constitutionality of a tax is the
due process requirement of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., United States
v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust
Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
11. See, e.g., Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933). See
generally ALI, FED. INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAx STAT. § X1007(h)
at 32-38 (April 1956 Draft); Note, 63 HAnr,. L. REV. 1047 (1950).
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take as a result of the disclaimer. 12 Moreover, it is questionable
whether it is desirable to subject such property to two taxes
3
merely because, in many instances, it will skip a generation.1
Further, it could be argued that since a disclaimer shows nothing
more than the unwillingness of the disclaimant to take the property, the disclaimant does not have the donative intent necessary
to subject the transfer to gift tax liability.
However, there are several justifications for treating a disclaimer as a taxable event.1 4 In most cases, the recipient of the
interest in event of disclaimer can be easily determined, and the
disclaimant knows to whom the interest will pass. Practically
speaking, the recipient upon disclaimer usually will be an heir of
the disclaimant,15 and a disclaimant who does not need the property for his personal sustenance can readily appreciate the tax
advantages of disclaiming. Thus, the motive behind disclaimers
is very likely to be tax avoidance,' 6 as a person is able to pass
more property by disclaiming than by accepting and subse12. Note that taxing a disclaimer would be particularly harsh in a
state having an inheritance tax. Not only would the disclaimant be
subject to a gift tax liability, he would be liable for the inheritance
tax without having any rights against the property disclaimed.
13. A person who keeps his will up to date, or has a discretionary
trust wherein the trustee is given the power to control the ultimate disposition of the property, or creates a substantial lifetime interest for one
generation with the property then passing to the next, is allowed to skip
a generation when disposing of his property without the imposition of
a second tax. But see ALI, FED. ESTATE AND Gnw TAx PROJECT at xxxixxxiii, xxxviii-xlii, § X41, at 110-20, § A44, at 335-36 (Nov. 1966 Draft)
(proposing imposition of an additional tax on generation skipping transfers). It is arguable that there is no reason for distinguishing these
cases and the disclaimed property situation; disclaimers should be allowed tax effect to avoid different tax consequences when the result
is identical in substance.
Possibly a tax could be justified as another method of preventing
undue accumulations of wealth. See note 21 infra. However, it is arguable that imposing a second tax in the disclaimer situation would
place too high a premium on expert estate planning.
14. See generally ALI, FED. INcoME, ESTATE, AND GIr TAX. STAT.
§ X1007(h) at 38-40 (April 1956 Draft); Comment, 33 CoLum. L. REV.
1269 (1933); Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1047 (1950).
15. Due to the presence in most states of an anti-lapse statute,
the disposition in event of disclaimer is very likely to be to the disclaimant's issue. See, e.g., MUnN.

STAT.

§ 525.203 (1965).

16. Note that the real potential for tax evasion is not when the
taker in event of disclaimer is a person in a higher generation or one of
the same generation, but rather only when the creator of the interest
is of a higher and the taker is of a lower generation than the disclaimant. See ALI, FED.

ESTATE AND

GiFT TAx PROJECT at xxxi-xxxiii, xxxviii-

xlii, § X41, at 110-20, § A44, at 335-36 (Nov. 1966 Draft), which imposes
an additional tax only on a generation skipping transfer of the nature
described above.
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quently passing the property inter vivos or through his estate. 17
Moreover, a cogent argument may be advanced that an interest passing due to a disclaimer fulfills the requirements for
the imposition of a gift tax. Since the disclaimant will normally
determine to whom the interest will pass if he disclaims before
deciding whether to disclaim or accept, upon disclaimer it seems
reasonable to impute an intention to make a gift to the taker.
The essence of a transfer is the passage of control over the economic benefits of property rather than technical changes in
title.18 Given these two elements, the disclaimer, in effect, becomes a gift. 19 Since the gift tax statute was enacted to prevent
estate tax avoidance through the voluntary inter vivos disposition of property, the power to channel the economic benefits of
an interest so as to effect tax avoidance is sufficient
reason to
20
justify treating the disclaimer as a taxable transfer.
Further, to allow a person to pass property received from a
prior generation to his heirs by use of a disclaimer without imposing a transfer tax seems inconsistent with the purpose of the
estate and gift taxes-the reduction of economic inequality produced by inherited wealth. 2' To favor such a person over one
17. If disclaimers are given tax effect and the beneficiary of an
interest wants the taker in event of disclaimer eventually to get some
of his property, he can accomplish this either by disclaiming or by first
accepting the interest and then making a gift. In the latter case, the
beneficiary will have made a taxable transfer while he would not have
in the former. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2511 (a). Clearly the only
difference is the tax consequence.
18. Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939). See Burnet
v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 287 (1933).
19. See Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S 184 (1943); Sanford v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939). See generally Merrill v. Fahs, 324
U.S. 308 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Rand,
What is a Gift?, 34 Ky. L.J. 99 (1946).
20. It has been contended that taxing a disclaimer as a gift on the
theory the disclaimant had control over the interest would produce
startling results in other areas of the law. See Note, 63 HARv. L. REV.
1047, 1048 (1950); Comment, 31 TEXAs L. REV. 599, 601 (1953). For
example, a wife who does not elect against her husband's will when the
statutory share is larger than the portion received would be deemed to
have made a gift of the difference. However, it seems clear this is not
the type of control which lends itself to tax avoidance, and thus there is
no justification for a tax. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
21. See JOINT COMM. ON THE Eco oMIc REPORT, 84TH CONG., 1ST
SEss., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISION Or FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES 864, 865 (Comm. Print. 1955); WEDGWOOD, THE EcONOmiIcS OF
INHERITANCE 12 (Pelican ed. 1939); cf. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v.
United States, 107 F. Supp. 941, 942 (Ct. Cl. 1952). But see JOINT COMM.
ON THE ECONoMc REPORT, 84th CONG., lST SEss., THE RISE AND DECLINE

OF THE ESTATE TAx 819 (Comm. Print 1955), where the author takes the
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who works to accumulate wealth during his lifetime and cannot
escape being taxed on what he passes, 22 only encourages the
perpetuation of wealth once it is accumulated.
Although the justifications for not taxing the act of disclaiming seem unpersuasive, existing provisions in the Internal Revenue Code sanction the use of disclaimers. 23 Congress has recently shown its intention to allow disclaimers to affect federal tax consequences by amending the estate tax law to allow
a disclaimer by a third party to increase the marital deduction
share.2 4 Thus, it would seem that disclaimers are to be given
tax effect, 25 and the only question is what limitations are to be
placed on the right.
Ill. FEDERAL LAW ON DISCLAIMERS
The federal gift tax statute is silent on the issue of whether
26
a disclaimer is a "transfer" within the meaning of the statute.27
The issue was raised for the first time in Brown v. Routzahn,
where the court held that a beneficiary may disclaim a testate
interest without incurring gift tax liability if the disclaimer is
valid under state law. 28 It could be contended that Brown was
improperly decided. When Congress passed the gift tax statute,
it was aware that the essence of a transfer is the passage of
control over the economic benefits of property rather than any
technical changes in title,29 and its intention was to reach every
gratuitous transfer.3 0 Since a disclaimant controls the ultimate
position that the only purpose behind the estate tax is the production
of revenue.
22. Notice the latter person has no way to refuse ownership of
any wealth attributable to his work and thus can not avoid either a gift
or estate tax when disposing of such wealth.
23. E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 678(d), 2041(a), 2055, 2056(d),
2514(a).
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(d) (2). Further, Congress has
provided that the person ultimately benefiting will bear the tax burden
in two analogous situations. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2206, 2207.
It is arguable that the failure of Congress to provide for payment of the
tax by the ultimate taker in the disclaimer situation is further evidence
of its unwillingness to treat a disclaimer as a taxable event.
25. See ALI, FED. ESTATE AND GiFT TAx PROJECT § Xlla at 23-26
(Nov. 1966 Draft), which also allows disclaimers tax effect. But note
the real tax advantages are lessened since there is an additional tax
imposed on generation skipping transfers. See note 13 supra.
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2511(a).
27. 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933).
28. Id. at 917.
29. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943); Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
30. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943). Further, when de-
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disposition of the property 3' and it is reasonable to impute to him
an intention to benefit the ultimate taker,8 2 it is arguable that
the disclaimant in Brown made a gratuitous transfer within the
meaning of the gift tax statute. However, the Brown court relied on the technical argument that the disclaimer prevented the
the owner, and thus no taxable transbeneficiary from becoming
33
fer could have occurred.
The reluctance of the court to tax a disclaimer might be
explained by an examination of the tax law pertaining to powers
of appointment in existence at that time. Brown was decided
when general powers were not taxed unless they were exercised. 34 The donee of a power could allow the power to lapse
and the interest to pass as provided for in default of appointment without incurring a tax. The disclaimer situation seems
analogous as the disclaimant is merely refusing to exercise affirmative control over the property, thus allowing it to pass as
provided in event of disclaimer. However, congressional policy
regarding taxation of powers has been revised,35 a general power
is now taxed even if not affirmatively exercised.3 6 But, despite
37
this change in congressional attitude toward general powers,
3s
existing provisions in the Internal Revenue Code and the federal regulations 39 afford tax insulation to disclaimers.
Two subsequent decisions firmly established that the disclaimer must be valid under state law to be effective for federal
ciding whether a taxable transfer has occurred, the courts have not felt
restrained by the common law definition of gift. See Commissioner v.
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945). See
generally Rand, supra note 19.
31. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
32. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
33. 63 F.2d at 917.
34. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(e), 40 Stat. 1097. Prior to
this it had been held in United States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921), that
a power of appointment was not includible in the gross estate under
the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202, 39 Stat. 777.
35. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 811(f), 53 State. 122, as
amended, ch. 619, § 403(a), 56 Stat. 942 (1942), where the taxability of
powers depends almost entirely on the type of power the donee had
rather than upon whether or not he affirmatively exercised it.
36. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041(a).
37. The donee of a general power seems to have more control than
a disclaimant. He has to accept the power, an affirmative exercise of
control, before he possesses the power for tax purposes. Further, he
has unlimited time, at least until death, to make disposition of the
property. On the other hand, even under the most lenient local law a
disclaimant would have only fourteen years to make his decision. See
note 80 infra and accompanying text.
38. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
39. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
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tax purposes. 40 In each case, state law provided that the interest
vested in the beneficiary at the death of the decedent, thereby
denying to him the option of accepting or refusing the interest.
In each case the disclaimer was denied tax effect on the rationale that the beneficiary was powerless to prevent title to the
interest from vesting in him; hence the act of disclaimer was a
transfer subject to the gift tax.41 The above three cases established that the validity of a disclaimer for federal tax purposes
was determined by ownership and that the fact of ownership was
solely dependent upon state law.
A 1958 regulation sets out three conditions to be fulfilled
before a disclaimer will be effective for federal tax purposes. It
42
provides that the disclaimer must be valid under local law;
that the disclaimer must be made within a reasonable time after
the disclaimant knows of the interest;43 and that the disclaimant
40. Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); William J. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
In Maxwell, the disclaimant was the beneficiary under the decedent's
will and was seemingly allowed to disclaim as legatee. But, since no
provision was made in the will in event of disclaimer, he took as heir
under the intestacy laws, and he could not effectively disclaim that
interest.
41. This distinction has been effectively discredited by text writers
on various grounds. See, e.g., Boger, Taxation of Renunciations of
Interests in Decedents' Estates Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes,
2 DuxE L.J. 5 (1951); Lauritzen, Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 Nw.
U.L.REV. 569 (1954); Comment, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 599 (1953); Comment,
5 V n. L. REV. 852 (1952). See also NEw YoRK LAW REVIsIoN ComMISSION 239-58 (1950). Further, it would seem that such a distinction
clearly places an undue and unjustifiable premium on technical estate
planning.
42. To be effective under state law, a disclaimant must have ".
a right to completely and unqualifiedly refuse to accept ownership of
property transferred from a decedent ... [and such refusal] must be
unequivocable and effective under the local law...." Treas. Reg. §
25.2511-1 (c) (1958).
The question of whether the words "completely and unqualifiedly"
in the regulation call for a disqualification of disclaimers made in states
where a beneficiary cannot disclaim to the detriment of his creditors has
been raised in 5 MERTENS § 34.14, at 70 n.75; cf. Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1428
(1938). Compare Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20
(1922), with In the Matter of Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401
(1940). However, William J. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952), seems to
indicate such disclaimers would be given effect. This result does not
allow a person to disclaim to defeat the rights of his creditors, but does
allow him to disclaim to deprive the government of a tax on the passage
of the property.
43. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). Inasmuch as a disclaimer must
be effective under local law, see note 42 supra and accompanying text,
it clearly cannot increase the time within which a person may disclaim.
Thus, the only situation in which this condition can operate is one in
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can not have accepted the interest prior to disclaiming. 44 This
regulation is a departure from prior interpretations of "transfer" 45 under the gift tax statute. 46 Under prior law, ownership
was the test of whether a disclaimer was a "transfer." 47 Under
that test, state laws determining property rights had to be given
sole and conclusive effect in affixing federal tax liability. 4 8 The
new regulation, by formulating two conditions in addition to
state law, adopts a test encompassing more than ownership.
Consequently, the disclaimer may be ineffective for federal tax
purposes even though the disclaimant is not deemed to have ownership of the interest under the local law.
The effect these two additional conditions will have on existing law is not altogether clear. Only one case, Fuller v. Commissioner,49 considers what is a "reasonable time" or "acceptance" within the meaning of the regulation. The court there
held that the disclaimer was not made within a reasonable time
and that acceptance had occurred within the meaning of the
which the local law would permit a disclaimer beyond the time interpreted as a reasonable time under the regulation. Although this concept
of timeliness should be used to equalize disparate results due to different state laws on disclaimers, see 5 MERTENS 92, it has not as yet
had this effect. But see Kathryn S. Fuller, 37 T.C. 147 (1961), which
indicates that such a result would be achieved, at least in part.
For an example of congressional intention not to allow disclaimers
tax effect when the disclaimant has retained his control for too long a
period of time, see INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 678 (d).
44. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
45. INT.REV. CODE or 1954, § 2511(a).
46. See notes 27-28, 33 and 40 supra and accompanying text.
47. Ibid.
48. When Congress has chosen to make the incident of taxation
dependent upon state property concepts, the local law determines the
taxpayers' rights in such property, and the federal taxing authorities are
bound by such determination. See Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35
(1934); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Gallagher v. Smith, 223
F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955); United States v. McCrackin, 189 F. Supp. 632
(D. Ohio 1960); In re Krakoff, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 116, 179 N.E.2d 566
(P. Ct. 1961); 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAxATIoN § 1.11 (1942).
However, when Congress has imposed its own criteria of taxability,
state law is immaterial when determining federal tax liability. See
Commissioner v. Greene, 119 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1941); Buck v. Helvering,
73 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1934); PAUL, op. cit. supra; cf. Guarantee Trust Co.
v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1938).
Although many cases attach importance to whether a state court
adjudication was nonadversary or collusive, see, e.g., Edgar M. Carnrick,
21 B.T.A. 12 (1930), this should be irrelevant. The real question is
whether Congress has chosen to make state property concepts determinative of the federal tax consequences. Thus, it is the state law
which controls in a proper case rather than the state court judgment.
See Gallagher v. Smith, supra (dicta); PAuL, op. cit. supra.
49. 37 T.C. 147 (1961).
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regulation. It further held that, regardless of the effectiveness of
the disclaimer under local law, the disclaimer was not effective
for federal tax purposes because the federal criteria of acceptance and reasonable time must be accorded independent significance. 0 In Fuller, the beneficiary was given a life estate in
her husband's residence, a trust to pay $50,000 a year for maintenance of the residence, and a five-eighths life estate income
interest in a residuary trust. Twenty-five years after the death
of her husband, she attempted to disclaim three-eighths of her
five-eighths interest in the residuary trust. The court first stated
that twenty-five years was clearly not a resonable time within
the meaning of the federal regulation. Moreover, the beneficiary had already accepted the interest. During probate, which
lasted twenty-five years, no record was kept of the expenditures
made on the house, and the income from the estate was used to
pay off decedent's debts. The court held that since the beneficiary could not prove that money from the second trust was
not used to maintain the house and because she allowed the income to be used to retire debts on the corpus of the residuary
trust thus increasing the value of her income interest, she would
be deemed to have accepted the five-eighths interest in the residuary trust within the meaning of the federal regulation.
Because the federal regulations do not define acceptance or
reasonable time, and because Fulleris the only case dealing with
the subject, 5 ' it is uncertain how stringent these requirements
will be in limiting the right of a beneficiary to effectively disclaim for federal tax purposes.
When the federal criteria of acceptance and timeliness are
applied to the disclaimer of present interests in common law jurisdictions, it appears at first blush that the state law is more
rigorous than the independent federal criteria-illuminated only
by the facts of the Fuller case.52 However, the change in prem50. On the question of the standards limiting the validity of regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, see generally Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).

51. With regard to the reasonable time requirement, cases which
involve income tax liability would seem to be distinguishable as the

timeliness of the disclaimer is keyed to the period preceding the fiscal
year in which the income is claimed to be taxable to the beneficiary
rather than the date of the creation of the interest. See First Nat'l Bank,
39 B.T.A. 828 (1957). For a discussion of one's ability to disclaim income
for income tax purposes, see Tritt, Renunciation-Income Tax Problems,
U. So. CAL. 1955 TAx INST. 519.
52. See notes 78-85 infra and accompanying text for the state law
criteria.
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ises is so great 53 that this result cannot be predicted with confidence. Under the pre-Fuller 54 test, federal gift tax policy underlying the taxation of disclaimers 5 was subordinated to nontax determinations of ownership under local law. 56 Under the
Fuller test, these tax policies are no longer so subordinated but
may be given independent significance in determining the regulatory tests of acceptance and timeliness in future federal gift
tax litigation. On the other hand, in the context of disclaimers
of present interests, it may be argued that the potential divergence between federal gift tax policies and local law criteria of
ownership may be at a minimum. If so, it seems unlikely the
courts would be prone to deviate from state law due to the
tradition and ease of relying entirely upon it.
When the federal criteria of acceptance and timeliness are
applied to disclaimers of present interests in jurisdictions where
the right to disclaim is controlled by statute,57 it seems more
likely that an independent judgment will be made on whether
the disclaimer is effective for federal tax purposes. This is because the motive behind a state disclaimer statute is likely to
be the attainment of favorable tax consequences for its citizens
whereas a common law determination of the effectiveness of a
disclaimer is unlikely to be influenced by that motive. Thus,
when a state statute allows disclaimers on a very permissive
basis,5 8 the tendency to invalidate such a disclaimer under the
federal criteria, given independent significance by Fuller, would
appear to be greater. However, when the purpose and effect of
the state statute is not unduly permissive in allowing disclaimers5 19 there should be no more tendency to find a disclaimer made
53. See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 27-28, 33, 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
55. The purpose of the gift tax was to prevent avoidance of the
estate tax by a system of inter vivos conveyances of property of which a
person had the beneficial use during his lifetime. Apparently the policy
behind any limitation upon a person's right to disclaim would be that a
person should not be permitted to disclaim an interest after having received some benefits from the interest or having the right to receive the
interest for a long period of time.
56. E.g., the rights of creditors as against the disclaimant.
57. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 15b-d, ch. 30, §§ 211-13
(1965); Mnu'N. STAT. §§ 291.111, 292.031, 501.211, 525.532 (1965).
59. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-10 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE AnN.

§ 2105.061 (Anderson Supp. 1966), where the purpose is obviously to
allow disclaimers of intestate shares to avoid the result reached in
Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 836 (1952). These statutes reflect the feeling that there are no
sound reasons for distinguishing for tax purposes between persons who
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under such a statute ineffective for federal tax purposes than one
made in a jurisdiction where the right to disclaim is controlled
by the common law.6 0
It is unclear how the federal criteria of acceptance or timeli-

ness will be applied to limit the ability to disclaim future interests. Due to the absence of state decisions, it is unknown what
restrictions will be placed on the right to disclaim future interests under state law. Because most future interests are such

that a beneficiary will not receive any tangible benefit 6 ' from the
interest for a substantial period of time, the effectiveness of

disclaimers under state law are likely to depend solely on the
issue of whether the lapse of time from the creation of the interest until the purported disclaimer is sufficient to constitute

acceptance. 62 In the property law context, there seems little
necessity for forcing the beneficiary of a future interest to make

a choice of accepting or rejecting such interest until he becomes
entitled to possession. Thus, it is arguable that, under state law,
the mere lapse of time would not be considered acceptance of a
future interest. 63 If this is the case, the policy underlying state
property concepts, in this context, would be inconsistent with the
motive behind the federal gift tax statute. 64 The gift tax is
aimed at taxing inter vivos gifts which allow the donor to avoid
the imposition of an estate tax on property he has had the beneficial enjoyment of during his lifetime. When a gift is made, the
donor's estate avoids the imposition of an estate tax on such
take by intestacy and those who take by inter vivos conveyance or under
a testamentary instrument. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
60. Of course, the same reasoning should apply when disclaimers
are made under the common law in states having a disclaimer statute
which retains all rights to disclaim already existing under the common
law. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. §§ 501.211(8), 525.532(8) (1965).
61. Traditionally, the only benefits which are considered such for
the purpose of determining whether acceptance has taken place are actual benefits, as distinguished from the benefit one derives from knowing, and thereby being able to plan accordingly, that he will receive
an interest at some time in the future.
62. There is no common law requirement that a disclaimer must
be made within a reasonable time. However, within the confines of
the doctrine of acceptance, time does have some relevance when determining the validity of a purported disclaimer under the common law
since the lapse of a lengthy period of time will make the presumption
of acceptance of a beneficial interest conclusive. See notes 78-80 infra
and accompanying text.
63. State statutes which permit disclaimers of future interests on a
very permissive basis, see, e.g., statutes cited note 58 supra, would be
more suspect that those wherein such rights were declared to be a part
of the state common law. See notes 57-60 supra and accompanying text.
64. See note 55 supra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:907

property on the theory that the gift was complete at its creation.
To disclaim after an extended period of time on the theory that
the gift is not yet complete would seem to be inconsistent with
the theory under which the interest escaped imposition of an
estate tax. It would also seem to subvert the basic policy behind these taxing statutes, 65 particularly when the disclaimant,
during this time, had the economic security of the right to receive
the interest. Thus, in contrast with local law, it appears that
federal criteria are likely to provide a more stringent limitation
upon the ability of a beneficiary to effectively disclaim a future
interest.
Even if effective and independent standards develop as to
what criteria constitute acceptance and reasonable time under
the federal regulations, state law would still be relevant, in that
a disclaimer, to be effective for federal tax purposes, would have
to be valid under local law.6 6 Consequently, the variances of
local law would still lead to a disparity of results under the
federal statute. There is little uniformity in state law as to
what constitutes an effective disclaimer. 67 Generally, under
common law, a legatee or devisee has the right to disclaim and
thus prevent ownership of the interest from vesting in him.6 8
But, with the exception of one jurisdiction,69 in the absence of
statute, an heir taking under the intestacy laws does not have
the common law option. The ownership of the interest vests in
him immediately upon the death of the decedent.70 However,
with at least eleven states having statutes permitting an intestate
share to be disclaimed,7'1 there would seem to be a significant
65. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
66. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
67. However, all jurisdictions hold that an inter vivos gift is not
complete until acceptance, thus allowing such a donee to effectively
disclaim the gift.
68. ATKINSON, WILLS § 139 & n.2 (2d ed. 1953); 6 PAGE, WILLS § 49.2
& n.1 (rev. ed. 1962). See Lauritzen, supra note 41.
69. Aurienne v. Mt. Olivet, Inc., 153 La. 451, 96 So. 29 (1923). See
Comment, Effective Renunciation of a Succession in Louisiana, 26 TUL.

L. REv. 81 (1952).

70. ATKINSON, WIILs § 139 & n.12 (2d ed. 1953); 6 PAGE, WILLS
§ 49.1 & n.1 (rev. ed. 1962); Annot., 170 A.L.R. 435 (1947). See Lauritzen, supra note 41.
Due to the controlling effect of locad law prior to the regulations, it
has been held, in accord with this distinction, that an interest created
by a testamentary instrument could be disclaimed for federal tax purposes, Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), while an intestate
share could not, Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); William L. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589
(1952). See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
71. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-43 (1963); ILL. REv. "STAT. ch. 3,
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split of authority on whether an intestate share may be disclaimed. 72 Thus, it is clear that the ability of an heir to effectively disclaim will depend on his domicile.
In addition, under common law there are at least three views
among the states as to whether and to what degree partial disclaimers will be permitted. 73 Although some states do not give
them any effect,7 4 the majority allow partial disclaimers when
two gifts are severable, unless the testator's intention is clearly
shown to be to the contrary. 75 However, a few of the latter
hold that a gift of two or more items is prima facie one gift and
require evidence of the testator's intention to the contrary before
giving effect to a partial disclaimer.7 6 Thus, even though the
§§ 15b-d, ch. 30, §§ 211-13 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-604 (1953);
MzN. STAT. §§ 291.111, 292.031, 501.211, 525.532 (1965); Mo. A.N. STAT.
§ 474.490 (1956); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 87-a (Supp. 1966); N.C. GEN.

STAT. § 29-10 (1966); Omo REV. CODE § 2105.061 (Anderson Supp. 1966);

R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-5-1 to 34-5-12 (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 42-4-3 (1966); WIs. STAT. AN. § 237.01(8) (Supp. 1967). See also
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1014-31 (West 1952), which is in accord with
prior statutory laws as interpreted by Aurienne v. Mt. Olivet, Inc., 153
La. 451, 96 So. 29 (1923); MODEL PROBATE CODE § 58 (1960).

72. Arguendo, state laws, providing that property passing by will
vests at the death of the decedent, could produce a split of authority on
whether a testate share could be disclaimed for federal tax purposes.
See, e.g., TEx. PROB. CODE § 37 (1962); CAL. PROB. CODE § 200. In finding
tax liability in the disclaimer of an intestate share, one court viewed as
controlling the fact that upon decedent's demise title vested immediately
in the disclaimant. Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952). This rationale would dictate
imposing a tax on the disclaimer of a testate share when state law
provides that title vests immediately upon the death of the decedent.
However, the states' theory of the relation-back of such a disclaimer,
see 6 PAGE, WnLLS § 49.4 (rev. ed. 1962), would be given effect to prevent
this result. See William L. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952), where the
court, although not so deciding, seemed to indicate that this would be
the result. Cf. In the Matter of Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d
401 (1940); Estate of Meyer, 107 Cal. App. 2d 799, 238 P.2d 597 (1951).
Compare Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958), with the proposed draft
of that regulation, quoted in 5 MERTENs § 34.14, at 69-70 & n.74, which
clearly indicates that the emphasis is on the disclaimant's right to refuse
the interest under state law rather than the technical question of
whether title had vested in the disclaimant.
73. See generally Annot., 91 A.L.R. 607 (1934).
74. See, e.g., Oglesby v. Springfield Marine Bank, 385 Ill. 414, 52
N.E.2d 1000 (1944) (by implication); Bailey v. McLain, 215 N.C. 150,
1 S.E.2d 372 (1939).
75. See, e.g., Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933); Town
of Pepperell v. Whipple, 327 Mass. 688, 100 N.E.2d 844 (1951); In re
Tisnower, 40 Misc. 2d 778, 244 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (by implication).
76. See Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 280, 6 A.2d 9 (1939). Contra,
State Banking Co. v. Hinton, 178 Ga. 68, 172 S.E. 42 (1933).
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federal regulation permits partial disclaimers,"7 the validity of
a partial disclaimer for federal tax purposes will still vary with
the domicile of the disclaimant.
Further, although all states presume acceptance of a beneficial interest and hold that the lapse of a long period of time
constitutes acceptance,78 there is no agreement on how long this
period must be before the presumption becomes conclusive. For
example, in one jurisdiction the presumption became conclusive
after four months 79 while in another the presumption was not
conclusive after fourteen years.8 0 Further, no uniformity exists
as to what words or conduct manifest an acceptance which will
bar a subsequent disclaimer. 81 It is generally held that acceptance may be by express words or declaration, or by other acts or
conduct indicating an intention to accept the interest. 82 However, there is a split of authority as to what will be the effect of
possession of the interest, 83 a written renunciation executed while
the testator was alive, 4 or a parol renunciation. 85 Thus, when
state law is more stringent than the federal criteria as to what
constitutes acceptance, variance dependent on the domicile of
the disclaimant is still possible.
Because of the above described disparities, and the federal
law's dependence upon a disclaimer's validity under local law,
77. The federal regulation clearly authorizes partial disclaimers.

Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). The only requirement is that the right
to partially disclaim must be recognized under local law.
78. See 6 PAGE, WILLS § 49.8 (rev. ed. 1962); Annot., 93 A.L.R.
2d 15 (1964).
79. In re Howe, 112 N.J. Eq. 17, 163 Atl. 234 (Prerog. Ct. 1932).

80. Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1943).
81. See generally 6 PAGE, WILLS § 49.9 (rev. ed. 1962); Annot.,

93 A.L.R.2d 15 (1964).
In most jurisdictions a renunciation must be clear and unequivocal,
thereby evidencing an intention to reject the interest. See, e.g., In re
Pellicer, 118 So. 2d 59 (Fla. App. 1960); Mackey v. Bowen, 332 Mass. 167,
124 N.E.2d 254 (1955); Sudekum v. Fasnacht's Estate, 236 Mo. App. 455,
157 S.W.2d 264 (1942). See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 15 (1964).
82. See, e.g., Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933); Wood

River v. Hart, 23 ll. 2d 119, 177 N.E.2d 173 (1961); cf. In re Campisi,

24 Misc. 2d 886, 202 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
83. Compare Blake v. Blake, 147 Ore. 43, 31 P.2d 768 (1934), with

Seifner v. Weller, 171 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1943).

84. Compare In re DeBancourt, 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937),
and Davies' Estate, 261 Pa. 525, 104 At]. 675 (1918), with McCarthy v.

McCarthy, 9 Ill. App. 2d 462, 133 N.E.2d 763 (1956), and Stewart v.
McDade, 256 N.C. 630, 124 S.E.2d 822 (1962).
85. Compare Coleman v. Burns, 103 N.H. 313, 171 A.2d 33 (1961),
and In the Matter of Wilson, 298 N.Y. 398, 83 N.E.2d 852 (1949), with
Pournelle v. Baxter, 151 Fla. 32, 9 So. 2d 162 (1942), and Bryan v. Hyre,
40 Va. (1 Rob.) 94 (1842).
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the application of federal tax law to a disclaimer will vary according to the taxpayer's domicile. It seems unfair to impose a
federal tax on one person because the law in his state does not
allow him to prevent title to an interest from vesting in him,
while another person in an identical situation will not be subjected to the tax merely because his state permits him to prevent
ownership from vesting. As the test for the validity of a disclaimer is no longer only ownership, the state law concepts which
were determinative under the ownership test are no longer the
sole criteria for determining the effectiveness of a disclaimer for
federal tax purposes. Thus, such a difference in treatment for
tax purposes is clearly arbitrary.8 6 Since the power of Congress
to tax is not subject to state control when federal criteria are
imposed, 87 and since a federal revenue statute should be interpreted to produce a uniform application of a nation-wide scheme
of taxation,8 8 the allowing of the vagaries of state property
concepts to control a federal scheme of taxation, to the exclusion
of existing federal criteria, would be unreasonable.8 9
Disclaimers should be taxed in some uniform manner. To
effectuate that end, two alternatives are available. First, disclaimers could be uniformly taxed under a control test, whether
or not effective under local law. This would call for regulations
specifying procedures for effectively disclaiming an interest, 90
86. Moreover, it is arguable that this is a violation of the due process clause. If the issue of whether a disclaimer is a "transfer" turns on
the question of ownership, as under the test prior to the regulation, the
consequences must vary with state law which determines ownership.
However, when the federal regulations make the decision that taxing
policies will no longer be subordinated to determination of ownership
for nontax purposes under local law, it seems arbitrary to allow the tax
consequences to continue to vary with such state law. The continuation
of the requirement that the disclaimer be effective under local law,
with its resultant disparities, would seem to have no reasonable relationship to these taxing policies. See note 55 supra; cf. United States v.
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194, 200-01 (1960); Detroit Bank
v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337-38 (1942).
87. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
88. See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932); Morgan v.

Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940) (by implication).
89. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Klein v. United
States, 283 U.S. 231 (1931).
It could be contended that there are good administrative reasons for
allowing federal tax results to depend on local law since this relieves
the necessity of both agencies determining, separately, the validity of a
purported disclaimer. However, were the federal government to promulgate one uniform standard, it would seem likely that the states would
conform thus relieving the necessity of this double determination.
90. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 15b-d, ch. 30, §§ 211-13 (1961);
MNN. STAT. §§ 501.211(4), 525.532(4) (1965).
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clearly defining what would be deemed an acceptance, after
which a disclaimer would not be permitted, 91 and denominating
92
a reasonable time in which to disclaim.
Second, even though effective standards as to what constitutes reasonable time and acceptance develop, if some dependence on local law remains, there would be a wide area wherein
disparity of result is possible.9 3 Therefore, it would seem essential to issue regulations aimed at eliminating, as much as is feasible, the inconsistent result possible under the present regula94
tions.
Apparently either of the above alternatives could be accomplished without legislative change. The Commissioner has already taken the difficult step of administratively overruling the
judicial interpretation of "transfer" by establishing federal criteria based on ownership and control. This has received judicial
approval. 95
IV.

MINNESOTA LAW ON DISCLAIMERS

A. THE LAW PRIOR TO THE NEW Di:sCLAnv\,R STATUTE
Prior to the disclaimer statute, " it was well settled in Minnesota that an attempted disclaimer of an intestate interest was
a taxable transfer on the theory that acceptance was not necessary to the vesting of ownership. 7 However, a testate interest
91. See, e.g., N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAw § 87-a (Supp. 1966); N.C. GEN.
§ 29-10 (1966).
92. See, e.g., ALI FED. ESTATE AmD GIFT TAX PROJECT § Xlla, at 25

STAT.

(Study Draft No. 2, 1966), where a period of fifteen months is set as
the maximum time within which to disclaim. See statutes cited note 71
supra.
93. See notes 66-85 supra and accompanying text.
94. One thing that should be done is to eliminate the distinction
created under state common law between testate and intestate interests
as there is no reason for distinguishing the two situations. See note
41 supra and accompanying text.
The imposition of a maximum time limit beyond which a disclaimer
would be ineffective would not eliminate disparity of result in states
which impose a shorter time limit. Nor would disparity of result in
states having stricter rules on what constitutes acceptance of an interest
be eliminated. However, it would seem the states would eventually
adopt the federal standards to insure their citizens as favorable treatment under the federal tax laws as the citizens of other states. Thus, it
would seem that the promulgation of such regulations would eventually
lead to a nationwide uniformity in the area.
95. See Kathryn S. Fuller, 37 T.C. 147 (1961).
96. Mimw. STAT. §§ 291.111, 292.031, 501.211, 525.532 (1965).

97. Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952). See Bengtson v. Setterberg, 227 Minn. 337,
35 N.W.2d 623 (1949).
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could be disclaimed without creating a taxable transfer, acceptance being held to be indispensible to the vesting of ownership
in a devisee or legatee 8 Further, the donee of an inter vivos
gift could disclaim his interest by virtue of the Minnesota rule
that a gift is not complete until accepted by the donee.9 9 Moreover, it appeared that partial disclaimers were effective. One
case indicated that the acceptance of a portion of an interest
coupled with a contemporaneous disclaimer of the remainder
would not be an acceptance of the entire interest. 100 Acceptance, however, of the entire interest would seem to bar subsequent disclaimer thereof.
Although it was clear which interests could be disclaimed,
only one case considered what constituted an acceptance which
would bar an attempted, subsequent disclaimer. The case held
that acceptance of an interest may be expressed in words or may
be inferred from conduct other than words.' 0 ' The court relied
specifically upon the conduct of the beneficiary in taking possession and maintaining the property. Unfortunately, due to the
ease with which the court was able to find acceptance on its
facts, 10 2 this case was of little assistance in formulating a well-

defined test as to what constitutes acceptance in Minnesota. In
addition, there is no case law in Minnesota on what would be a
reasonable time after which the presumption of acceptance becomes conclusive. The Minnesota State Tax Department Inheritance and Gift Tax Regulations are of no assistance. They left
the question to the courts by merely stating that a disclaimer or
renunciation of an interest would be given tax effect if the disclaimer was in accord with, and effective under Minnesota law,
and was made within 0 a3 reasonable time after the disclaimant
learned of the interest.

B. THE NEW DiscLAmmR STATUTE
The statute' 04 is of considerable value as it improves, clarifies, and supplements prior Minnesota law in the disclaimer area.
98. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N.W. 902 (1919); see
Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933).

99. See Werner v. Miller, 248 Minn. 75, 78 N.W.2d 63 (1956);
Davis v. Kuck, 93 Minn. 262, 101 N.W. 165 (1904).
100. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N.W. 902 (1919).
See Minn. Tax Dept. Gift & Inheritance Tax Regs. § 39 (1959), which

also recognizes the validity of partial disclaimers for state tax purposes.
101. Schaeffer v. Newberry, 235 Minn. 282, 50 N.W.2d 477 (1951).
102. Ibid. In addition to possession and maintenance, the city assessed no taxes on the property after the creation of the interest.
103. Minn. Tax Dept. Gift &Inheritance Tax Regs. § 39 (1959).
104. Mn. STAT. §§ 291.111, 292.031, 501.211, 525.532 (1965).
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It clearly defines which interests can effectively be disclaimed. 1 5
Reversing the Hardenberghrule, 10 6 the statute provides that an
interest in the estate of an intestate, if disclaimed under the
statute, never vests in the disclaimant 0 7 In addition, the statute allows partial disclaimers, 03 augmenting the meager Minnesota authority on the question. 0 9 Further, in the event of disclaimer, the statute specifies with particularity who is to succeed to a disclaimed interest if no disposition is provided for by
the creating instrument," 0 and is also helpful in specifying the
circumstances under which a fiduciary for an incompetent beneficiary may disclaim on behalf of the beneficiary."' Moreover,
the statute sets out with specificity certain procedures to be followed in disclaiming interests" 2 and insures that disclaimers
made in compliance with the statute will be given tax effect for
state tax purposes by amending two sections of the gift and inheritance tax statutes." 3
Although the statute in many respects is carefully drafted, it
has numerous defects which create serious problems in its interpretation. The statute specifically bars an insolvent beneficiary
MnbN. STAT. §§ 501.211(1) (b), 525.532(1) (b) (1965).
106. Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952). See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying
105.

text.

107. i-nq-. STAT. § 525.532 '5) (1965). Due to the Minnesota rule
that title to an intestate share vests in the heir or next-of-kin by operation of law, see note 97 supra and accompanying text, the interest actually vests in the disclainant. However, a valid disclaimer under the
statute relates back to the death of the decedent serving to divest such
title which is then deemed to have never vested in the disclaimant.
108. MYINN. STAT. §§ 501.211(2), 525.532(2) (1965). See Mmn. STAT.
§§ 501.211(1) (b), 525.532(1) (b) (1965).
109. See Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N.W. 902 (1919).
110. MfNx. STAT. §2 501.211(5), 525.532(5) (1965).
111. MlwN. STAT. §2 501.211(2), 525.532(2) (1965). This subdivision
provides:
a guardian, executor, administrator or other personal representative of the estate of a minor, incompetent, or deceased
beneficiary, if he deems it in the best interests of those interested in the estate of such beneficiary and of those who take
the beneficiary's interest by virtue of the disclaimer and not
detrimental to the best interests of the beneficiary, with or
without an order of the probate court, may execute and file a
disclaimer on behalf of the beneficiary. ...
Prior to this statute, there was no authority on whether a fiduciary
could so disclaim without incurring liability to the beneficiary should
the beneficiary later become competent. Thus, due to the cautious nature of most fiduciaries, it seems this provision was necessary to en-

courage them into making such disclaimers in a proper situation.
112.
INiN. STAT. §2 501.211(4), 525.532(4) (1965).
113. Mum. STAT. 2§ 291.111, 292.031 (1965).
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from disclaiming under the statute. 114 But, since there is no case
law on the question in Minnesota and the statute specifically reserves all valid means of disclaiming an interest under the common law," 5 the question of whether an insolvent beneficiary
may disclaim an interest outside the scope of the statute remains
unsettled." 6 However, this proviso is sufficient enough expression of legislative intent to allow the courts, in a disclaimer
situation, to protect creditors by holding that insolvent beneficiaries 17are not allowed to disclaim interests even outside the
statute."
Unfortunately, the retention of all other valid means of disclaiming an interest under the common law" s would seem to
114. MwuN. STAT. §§ 501.211(6), 525.532(6) (1965). Both subdivisions provide: "The right to disclaim otherwise conferred by this section
shall be barred if the beneficiary is insolvent at the time of the event

giving rise to the right to disclaim...."

Since a beneficiary may disclaim any interest under MuN. STAT. §9
501.211(2), 525.532(2) (1965), it seems the "event giving rise to the right
to disclaim" would be the creation of the interest for those disclaimable
under § 501.211, and the death of the creator of the interest for those
disclaimable under § 525.532. Thus, it seems that intervening creditors
are not protected, for a beneficiary would not be barred from disclaiming
under the statute by these subdivisions if he became insolvent after
the event giving rise to the right to disclaim. Apparently, however,
such a beneficiary would still be barred under the common law from
disclaiming under these circumstances. See note 117 infra and accompanying text.
115. MwNn. STAT. §§ 501.211(8), 525.532(8) (1965).
116. It could be contended that the statute itself bars a disclaimer
by an insolvent beneficiary under the common law because this right as
given in subdivision 9, and subdivision 6 bars any right of an insolvent
beneficiary to disclaim under the statute. However, subdivision 8 merely
retains any right to disclaim existing apart from the statute. The proper
interpretation would seem to be that the right to disclaim apart from the
statute is allowed rather than "conferred by this section" and thus, subdivision 6 is no bar to such a disclaimer.
117. The other jurisdictions are split on the question of whether an
insolvent beneficiary may disclaim to the detriment of his creditors.
Compare Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922),
with In the Matter of Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1941).
However, the trend is toward protecting the rights of creditors, and
most state disclaimer statutes bar insolvent beneficiaries from disclaiming. See statutes cited note 71 supra.
Further, it would seem absurd to say a beneficiary may not disclaim
under the statute, but may disclaim under the common law by merely
allowing the time limit for a valid disclaimer under the statute to run
or even by disclaiming in a manner not in conformity with the statute
during such time. This makes sense only if the legislature does not
mind if insolvent beneficiaries disclaim to the detriment of their creditors,
but consider such conduct reprehensible enough that they do not want
to legislatively sanction it.
118. MINN. STAT. §§ 501.211(8), 525.532(8) (1965).
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preserve the Hardenbergh distinction for disclaimers attempted
outside the scope of the statute.1n Although the inequity of
Hardenbergh is somewhat alleviated by the statute, there is no
valid reason for preserving this distinction even for disclaimers
attempted outside the statute. 120 Thus, some provision reversing
the Minnesota rule that title to an intestate share vests immediately upon the death of the decedent 121 would have been appropriate.
The most obvious defect is that the disclaimer statute says
nothing about the effect of an acceptance of the interest upon
the beneficiary's ability to subsequently disclaim that interest.
Thus, a question of serious consequence arises as to whether one
who, either before or after becoming a beneficiary under the
statute, has manifested acceptance of an interest can later
change his mind and disclaim, if he does so within the period
permitted by the statute. It could be argued, through a literal
reading of the statute, that one who has already accepted a
particular interest may still effectively disclaim such interest
under the statute. Subdivision 2 provides that "a beneficiary may
disclaim any interest ... by filing a disclaimer ....,122 in con119. Arguendo, the statute also reverses the Hardenberghrule as to
disclaimers attempted outside the statute. Subdivision 5 provides that
"an interest of any nature in or to the estate of an intestate may be disclaimed, refused or disclaimed as herein provided without ever vesting
in the disclaimant." It could be argued that disclaimers outside the
statute are provided for in subdivision 8 and therefore the Hardenbergh
rule is reversed even for those disclaimers. However, the right to disclaim outside the statute already existed prior to the enactment of the
statute, and subdivision 8 merely retains this right. See note 116 supra.
Thus, it would seem the proper interpretation is that these rights were
not "herein provided" within the meaning of subdivision 5.
Further, it could be argued that the treatment of intestate shares
within the statute expresses a legislative intention to make a disclaimer
of an intestate share as available as the disclaimer of interests created
by will or inter vivos conveyance. In light, however, of the long standing rule that an interest created by iniestacy vests immediately in an
heir, a Minnesota court would still hold the disclaimer to be a taxable
transfer. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
Moreover, even if the Minnesota courts were to allow the disclaimer
tax effect for state tax purposes, there is a possibility that the disclaimer
would not be effective for federal tax :purposes as the federal regulations specify the beneficiary must have a "right to completely and unqualifiedly refuse to accept ownership of the property transferred. ..
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (c)(1958). But see note 42 supra, for reasoning
which would indicate that the hypothetical determination of the Minnesota court would be controlling.
120. See authorities cited note 41 supra.
121. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
122. Mnwq. STAT. §§ 501.211(2), 525.532(2) (1965). (Emphasis added.)
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formity with the statute. Since subdivision 2 clearly says "any
interest" may be disclaimed and the statute contains no qualification regarding acceptance, it could be argued that even if an interest has already been accepted, this does not take it out of the
plain meaning of the words "any interest." However, to fit within
the meaning of subdivision 2, three conditions must be met: the
disclaimant must be a "beneficiary" within the meaning of subdivision 1 (a) ;123 the method such beneficiary employs to effectuate his disclaimer must be a "disclaimer" within the meaning of
subdivision 1 (c) ;124 and what is attempted to be disclaimed must
be an "interest" within the meaning of subdivision 1(b).1125 It is
taken as given that he has a qualified interest and has accepted
such interest. To show conformity with the other two conditions,
it could be argued that the words defining a beneficiary as "any
person entitled, but for his disclaimer, to take an interest . .."
mean nothing more than that a person is a beneficiary when entitled to take an interest if his disclaimer is not effective. Assuming he is a beneficiary, the only question is whether the interest
was disclaimed by a method which is a "disclaimer" within the
meaning of subdivision 1(c), defining such disclaimer as "a written instrument which declines, refuses, releases, renounces or disclaims an interest which would otherwise be succeeded to by a
beneficiary .... ,126 It could be contended that a disclaimer executed by a person who has already accepted an interest falls
within the meaning of "releases," since the term arguably denotes, in the context of estates in property, the giving up of an
interest in the form of conveyance. 127 Thus, since the acceptance
of an interest produces ownership and there must be ownership
of an interest before it can be surrendered, the word "release"
provides a method by which a person may disclaim an interest
within the meaning of subdivision 1(c) even after acceptance.
Therefore, on the basis of the above reasoning, a person who has
accepted an interest may, if within the time permitted by the
12 8
statute, effectively disclaim such interest under the statute.
123. He may qualify as a beneficiary under either M-xx.
8 501.211(1) (a)(1965) or MAiNN. STAT.§ 525.532(1) (a)(1965).
124. AlxNN.STAT.H8 501.211(1) (c), 525.532(1) (c) (1965).
125. M.iN. STAT.88 501.211 (1)(b), 525.532(1) (b) (1965).
126. Mxnx. STAT. §8 501.211(1) (C),525.532(1) (c) (1965).
127. BLAcx, LAw DIcTIoNARY 1453-54 (4th ed. 1951).

STAT.

128. The statute treats the doctrine of acceptance positively in subdivision 6 by enumerating acts of acceptance which will bar an insolvent
beneficiary from subsequently disclaiming under the statute. It could be
argued that this, coupled with the silence of the rest of the statute on
the question of acceptance, infers that the doctrine of acceptance is
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But there are three serious defects in this analysis. First, it is
arguable that a person who has already accepted an interest can
not become a beneficiary within the meaning of subdivision 1 (a).
The language "any person entitled, but for his disclaimer, to take
an interest ....
"129 support this conclusion.
A person who has
already accepted an interest is not a person entitled to take
an interest but a person who has already taken the interest.
Since the legislature very likely contemplated the time-event
sequence of a person becoming entitled to receive an interest
and then refusing to accept such interest, it probably intended
that the words "entitled to take" would refer to a person who
has not already taken the interest. Thus, it seems a person who
has accepted an interest prior to becoming entitled to take such
interest could never become a beneficiary, and a person who has
already become a beneficiary can no longer continue as one
after his acceptance of the interest. 3"
Second, the definition of "disclaimer" in subdivision 1 (c) in
referring to "an interest which would otherwise be succeeded to
by a beneficiary,"'' a seems inapplicable to an interest which has
already been succeeded to by a person as a result of his prior
acceptance of the interest. Therefore, the disclaiming of an ineliminated from the statute by negative implication. However, this is
a creditor's provision and the acts enumerated merely serve to buttress
the preceeding sentence which disallows disclaimers by insolvent beneficiaries. Thus, the provision should have no effect on the interpretation of the rest of the statute.
Further, it could be argued that the statute should be interpreted to
do away with the doctrine of acceptance in order to give the six-month
time provision of subdivision 3 independent significance. However, it
would seem this time provision merely reflects the legislature's belief
that this was a reasonable time in which to decide, rather than an intention to allow a person who has already accepted to subsequently disclaim.
129. MInN. STAT. §§ 501.211(1) (a), 525.532(1) (a) (1965).
(Emphasis added,)
130. However, at the end of subdivision 6 the word "beneficiary"
seems to be used to refer to a person who has already manifested acceptance of an interest. From this, it could be argued that a person may still
be a "beneficiary" after acceptance of an interest. But, it seems the purpose of the sentence is to make explicit the principle that the performance of any one of the enumerated acts will bar even a person entitled to
disclaim under the statute, whether or not such conduct would be deemed
to be an acceptance. The use, therefore, of "beneficiary" in this context
is not sufficient to overcome the sound reasons for construing the statute
to mean that a person may not be a beneficiary of an interest after he
has accepted it.
Notice also that the word "beneficiary" is again used inconsistently
in subdivision 7, as it seems to refer to a person who has already disclaimed his interest and thus is no longer entitled to take such interest.
131. Mmw. STAT. §§ 501.211(1) (c), 525.532(1) (c) (1965).
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terest already accepted could not be a proper disclaimer under
the statute as it is not a "disclaimer" as defined in subdivision

1 (c).
Third, due to the fact the definition of disclaimer would
appear inapplicable to an interest already accepted, 132 it makes
more sense to interpret the word "releases" in the context of subdivision 1 (c) as meaning releases a right to succeed to an interest
rather than releases an interest which already has been accepted.
Besides denoting the giving up of an interest in the form of a
conveyance, a release commonly denotes the conveyance of a
right possessed. 133 Thus, it is reasonable to construe "releases"
as meaning the giving up of a right to accept the interest.
Further, due to the fact the word "releases" appears in a conjunctive listing with four other words denoting methods of refusing to accept an interest, to interpret it in any way other
than as a release of a right to accept or succeed to a interest
would do violence to the context in which the word appears.
Moreover, since a disclaimer is generally thought to be an act
by which a person refuses to accept an interest, 13 4 it would be
inconsistent to construe the word "releases" in such a way as to
allow a person to refuse to accept an interest which he has
already accepted. 1 5
Hence, under what seems the better construction of the
statute, there can be no effective disclaimer of an interest under
the statute once a person has manifested acceptance of an interest even though the disclaimer is attempted within the time
period permitted by the statute.
Further, even if the two foregoing interpretations were entitled to equal weight, there are sound policy reasons for construing the statute to not allow a person to effectively disclaim
an interest after its acceptance. First, it would seem unwise to
interpret a statute to completely overrule the well recognized
common law doctrine of acceptance on such a literal reading of
the statutory language; a more explicit mandate from the legislature should be required to reach such a result. A statute which
can, on the latter interpretation, be so easily reconciled with
existing common law doctrine surely should be read to give ef132. See ibid.
133. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1453-54 (4th ed. 1951).
134. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
135. Note the use of "release" in subdivision 7 where it clearly denotes the giving up of an interest in the form of a conveyance. However,
it is in a conjunctive listing with two words having that meaning and
thus it should be construed in that context.
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fect to such doctrine.
Second, to adopt the former interpretation of the statute
would clearly bring Minnesota disclaimer doctrine into direct
conflict with the existing federal law as to what constitutes an
effective disclaimer for federal tax purposes. 13 6 Although there
is no well developed federal doctrine of what constitutes acceptance, 137 there cannot be an effective disclaimer of an interest
for federal tax purposes after its acceptance, regardless of the
effectiveness of such disclaimer under the local law.las It would
seem that, since there is no compelling or even sound policy
reason for allowing a person to disclaim an interest he has
already accepted, 39 the policy of creating uniformity in the law
should be accorded some weight.
Assuming there can be no effective disclaimer of an interest
after its acceptance, the statute is silent regarding the effect of
acceptance of a particular benefit on a subsequent disclaimer of
related benefits. For example, if a beneficiary is entitled to income from a trust for life, paid quarterly, it is unclear what the
effect of an acceptance of the first quarterly installment will be
upon his right to disclaim subsequent installments. The question presented is whether his conduct manifests an acceptance
of merely that payment or should be construed as an acceptance
of the entire right to income for life, thus preventing a subsequent disclaimer. Of course it may be contended only the first
payment was accepted and this does not constitute acceptance of
future payments. However, at the time the first payment was
accepted there was no indication the beneficiary had any intention of not accepting the entire interest. 140 Therefore, since ac136. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). See notes 42-65 supra and
accompanying text.
137. See notes 42-65 supra and accompanying text.
138. Kathryn S. Fuller, 37 T.C. 147 (1961); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)
(1958). See notes 42-65 supra and accompanying text.
139. It could be contended that refusing to allow disclaimers tax
effect after acceptance could produce harsh results if the beneficiary
has accepted the interest without knowledge of the actual facts. However, since intention to take the interest and all the surrounding circumstances are considered in determining whether acceptance has occurred,
it is submitted that no such results will occur.
140. See Kathryn S.-Fuller, 37 T.C. 147 (1961). In Fuller, the beneficiary was precluded from disclaiming, tax-free, subsequent payments
of trust income because she had already accepted some previous payments, and was thereby deemed to have accepted the bequest of the
trust income. Her acceptance was imputed from the fact that the income
payments were applied to debts of the corpus of the trust which would
increase the amount of her income derived from the trust and thus were
for her ultimate benefit. But see Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 714 (1933).
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ceptance of a gift is in accord with common sense and experience, 141 such action should be deemed sufficient to show acceptance of the right to income for life, absent evidence of a prior
or contemporaneous disclaimer. 142 Moreover, it is reasonable
to view conduct manifesting an acceptance of a property interest
as conduct whereby a beneficiary acts as the owner of such
property. Ordinarily property owners do not have to assert each
and every one of the severable rights which they possess in
respect to their property in order to act like owners. Accordingly, when it appears that a person has accepted an interest in
an asset or fund of assets, such action should be construed as an
act of dominion over the property sufficient to manifest an intention to accept the whole rather than just the part over which
the actual act of dominion was exercised.
The most significant defect in the statute is that it fails to
make clear when the six month period within which a disclaimer
is permitted begins. 143 A disclaimer under the statute must be
filed within six months after the death of the person creating
the interest or the effective date of the instrument creating the
interest unless the beneficiary is not "finally ascertained"' 44 or
the interest has not become "indefeasibly fixed both in quality
and quantity.' 45 But in any case the interest must be dis141. Pournelle v. Baxter, 151 Fla. 32, 9 So. 2d 162 (1942); Strom v.
Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 Pac. 1100 (1917). See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
142. It is arguable that the presumption of acceptance should be
given probative force as proof of acceptance at the time the first payment
is received. In Minnesota a presumption has been held to be entitled to
no probative force in the face of evidence to the contrary. Kath v. Kath,
238 Minn. 120, 55 N.W.2d 691 (1952). Being merely a device to shift the
burden of proof to the person taking a position contrary to the presumption, it drops out of the case when some evidence to the contrary is
introduced. Id. at 123-24, 55 N.W.2d at 693-94; lRoop v. Greenfield, 352
Pa. 232, 42 A.2d 614 (1945); McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 313 (1954); 9
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940). However, in the absence of a
contemporaneous disclaimer, at the time the first payment was accepted
there was no contrary evidence. Since this particular presumption is
taken from experience and common sense rather than being a presumption raised for merely procedural convenience, see McCoRMicK, EviDENCE §§ 307-18 (1954); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940), it
seems it should be given probative force at the time the first income
payment is accepted as long as there is no evidence to the contrary.
143. Other state disclaimer statutes, with the possible exception of
Illinois, impose an absolute time limit which begins to run at the death
of decedent or some easily identifiable event such as the time when the
interest is admitted to probate or the time the letters of administration
are issued. See statutes cited in note 71 supra.
144. MTNN. STAT. §§ 501.211(3), 525.532(3) (1965).
145. Ibid.
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claimed within six months after the event which causes the
disclaimant to become "finally ascertained" as a beneficiary and
his interest to become "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and
146
quantity."
The meaning of the phrase "finally ascertained as a beneficiary" is unclear. It may refer to final ascertainment of
whether the beneficiary will ultimately take something, in which
case no holder of a conditional interest could be finally ascertained. Or it may refer to final identification of the individual
as a taker of some interest, no matter how indefinite. Subdivision 1(a) of the statute defines a beneficiary as a person "entitled, but for his disclaimer, to take an interest .

.

.

"

Since

subdivision 1(b) defines "interest" so broadly as to include interests in property which are obviously conditional, 147 it appears
that the second construction is proper. Thus, it seems probable
that the phrase appears in the statute merely to cover situations
in which it cannot be determined whether a particular person is
a beneficiary 14 or in which the beneficiary is not yet in ex49
istence.1
The words "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity," generate more difficulty since they have no well understood, fixed meaning. The proposed Minnesota Inheritance Tax
Regulations take the position that an "interest" is "indefeasibly
fixed both in quality and quantity" when it is "indefeasibly
vested."' 50 However, since the words "indefeasibly vested" have
a well defined legal meaning, the legislature would have inserted "indefeasibly vested" in the statute had this been the intended meaning. The phrase "indefeasibly fixed both in quality
and quantity" refers to an attribute which an interest must possess before the six month period within which a person may effectively disclaim begins to run. The word "interest," as defined in the statute, clearly refers to interests in both real and
personal property. 15' But since most personal property concepts
146. Ibid.

147. Mum. STAT. §§ 501.211(1) (b), 525.532(1) (b) (1965).
The
words "any estate in any such property" clearly make the definition of
"interest" inclusive of conditional interests.

148. An example would be where litigation over an interest makes

undeterminable whether or to what extent a person will become a beneficiary.
149. An example is the class gift situation where one born into the
class is entitled to take as a beneficiary.
150. Minn. Tax Dept. Gift & Inheritance Tax Regs. § 39(5) (Proposed Regs. 1967).
151. MNxN. STAT. §§ 501.211 (1) (b), 525.532(1) (b) (1965).
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were derived from real property law, it would seem reasonable
to use real property concepts when attempting to determine the
5 2
meaning of "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity.'
Accordingly, an interest is "indefeasible" when it is not subject
153
to being changed by a condition precedent or subsequent.
Something is "fixed" when it is set or decided upon. 54 Therefore, "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity" should
mean that the "quality" and "quantity" of the interest are not
subject to being changed due to any condition. Thus, the basic
question is the meaning of the words "quality" and "quantity."
The word "quality" denotes the characteristics, elements, or
attributes a thing possesses; 5 5 it refers to the basic nature of a
thing.15 6 Thus, when referring to the word "interest" in a legal
context, "quality" should mean the legal attributes an interest
possesses. In the law of property, "quality" traditionally refers
to the period 157 when the right of enjoyment of an estate in
property is conferred upon the owner, and to the manner in
which the owner's right of enjoyment is to be exercised. 58 Under this construction, no contingent interest would be "indefeasibly fixed" as to "quality" because the period when the right
of enjoyment would be conferred would not be certain. Further,
any present or future vested interest subject to divestment on
condition subsequent would not be "indefeasibly fixed" as to
"quality" because the manner in which the beneficiary has the
152. Further, the statute itself lends support to this interpretation
by using the words "or any estate in any such property" to refer to
both interests in real and personal property. Ibid.
153. See In the Matter of Estate of Cutler, 3 Misc. 2d 44, 154 N.Y.S.
2d 292 (SuIr. Ct. 1957); In the Matter of Estate of Faber, 191 Misc. 828,
829, 80 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (Surr. Ct. 1948); cf. BLAcK, LAw DicrioNAR
909 (4th ed. 1951); Bouvisa, LAW DIcTIONARY 534 (Baldwin ed. 1948).
154. See National Candy Co. v. Miller, 160 Fed. 51, 56 (8th Cir.
1908); WEmsTE's NE w WORLD DICTiONARY 549 (Col. ed. 1964).
155. WEasRa's NE w WORLD DICTIoNARY 1189 (Coil. ed. 1964).

156. Ibid.
157. The word "period" means any point, space, or division in time.
BLACK, LAW DIcTIoNARY 1297 (4th ed. 1951). In the present context, it
would seem to mean either the length of time specified or the point in
time when enjoyment of the interest will commence, e.g., at the end of a
prior estate in the interest, rather than a particular day of commencement.
158. Examples of the manner in which the right may be exercised
are in fee, tenancy in common, or joint tenancy. BLACK, LAW DIcTIoNARY 1406 (4th ed. 1951); 2 Jowrnv, THE DICTioNARY OF ENGLISH LAW
1451 (1959). See RESTATEIENT, PROPERTY § 9 (1936); cf. Gross v. Keystone Point, Inc., 115 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1959); Dustin v. Brown, 297 Ill.
499, 130 N.E. 859 (1921); Richardson v. VanGundy, 271 Ill. 476, 111 N.E.
494 (1916).
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right of enjoyment can be changed. 1 9 However, present and
future interests which are neither contingent nor vested subject
to divestment on condition subsequent would be "indefeasibly
fixed" as to "quality" because the period of the right of enjoyment and the manner in which it will be enjoyed would be certain.
The word "quantity," in the property context, denotes the
degree or the time of continuance of an interest. 16 0 This is susceptible of two different interpretations. First, it could denote
the actual time of continuance of an interest. Under this interpretation no interest, other than a fee simple, would ever be
"indefeasibly fixed" as to "quantity" because the time when the
person holding the interest is going to die is never certain. 1 1
Second, it could be interpreted to mean maximum potential
duration of an interest. 162 Thus, an interest would be "indefeasibly fixed" as to "quantity" when it is finally determined
that a beneficiary has a particular interest and that his right to
such interest is not subject to condition precedent or subsequent
which would terminate his interest prior to the end of the maxi6 3
mum potential duration of such interest.
159. Examples are a joint tenancy or class gift subject to open.
However, this interest would seem to be "indefeasibly fixed" as to
"quality" since the period when the right of enjoyment is conferred on
the owner is set as the time from the creation of this interest until the
happening of the condition subsequent. See Richardson v. VanGundy,
supra note 158.
160. BouvER, LAw DIcTIoNArtY 1007 (Baldwin ed. 1948); 2 JowrrT,

op. cit. supra note 158, at 1452; cf. Bouvir, op. cit. supra at 364.
161. The possibility of death would not prevent a fee simple from
being indefeasibly fixed as to quantity, because on death the interest
passes to the beneficiary's estate.
However, under this construction a fee simple determinable might
not be "indefeasibly fixed" as to "quantity." The fact that the fee simple
is subject to divestment if the restriction put on the use of the interest in
the conveyance by the original grantor is violated may prevent the
interest from being indefeasibly fixed as to quantity because the actual
time of enjoyment cannot be finally determined.
162. See 1 JowrrT, op. cit. supra note 158, at 735, which indicates that
quantity is synonymous with the extreme limit of the duration of an
interest. See also M__NN. STAT. § 500.01 (1965), which appears to indicate that "quantity" refers to the type of interest created rather than the
actual time it will continue.

163. Cf. Dustin v. Brown, 297 11. 499, 130
Richardson v. VanGundy, 271 Ill. 476, 478, 111
which use "quantity" as denoting proportional
Defining "quantity" in this manner would mean

N.E. 859 (1921), and
N.E. 494, 496 (1916),
share of the interest.
an interest would not

be "indefeasibly fixed" as to "quantity" until its value was determined-

the quantitative share. See Richardson v. VanGundy, supra at 478, 111
N.E. at 496.
However, both cases deal with the partition of remainder interests
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To determine the meaning of "indefeasibly fixed both in
quality and quantity," it is necessary to construe those words in
light of their relationship to the sections of the statute providing for the disposition of the disclaimed interest. Subdivision
5 of the statute provides that if the instrument creating the
interest does not contain a provision disposing of such interest in
the event of disclaimer, a disclaimed interest shall be distributed
as if the disclaimant had died immediately prior to the "death
or other event which causes him to become finally ascertained
as a beneficiary and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed
both in quality and quantity .... ,,164 If a beneficiary disclaims
after his interest has become "indefeasibly fixed both in quality
and quantity," there is no problem. However, if the beneficiary
disclaims before the event which causes his interest to become so
fixed, difficulties arise.
For example, suppose the common situation where H creates
a trust giving W income for life, remainder to S and D or the
survivor of the two for life, remainder per stripes in fee to the
issue of S and D then living at the death of the survivor of S
and D. W disclaims. If "quantity" is construed as meaning the
actual time of continuance of an interest, W's life estate would
not be indefeasibly fixed as to "quantity" at any time prior to
her death. The beneficiaries of the income interest could not be
ascertained until her death since the beneficiaries are to be determined as if she had died immediately before the event which
caused her interest to be "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and
quantity," and her death is the only event which would make
her interest indefeasibly fixed as to "quantity." The trustee
would not distribute any income since, if S or D should predecease W, he would be liable to the survivor of S or D for all
payments of income made to the one predeceasing W. This
interpretation leads to the absurd result of the trustee not distributing any income until the death of W. Since the legislature
in the class gift situation where additional children, by birth, would
become members of the class. Thus, since the class gift situation is
unique and the court was obviously straining to protect the shares of
unborn children, it would seem this use of "quantity" is only applicable
to that situation. Further, even though the words "indefeasibly fixed
both in quality and quantity" were apparently borrowed from the Illinois disclaimer statute, see ILL. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 15b-d; ch. 30, §§ 211-13
(1963), the words of the MVinnesota statute should be construed in light
of their meaning under the Minnesota law of property. Hence, since
there is no indication that MVinnesota law attaches this unusual meaning
to the word "quantity," it seems the ordinary property law definition of
"quantity" would be adopted.
164. Mnx. STAT. §§ 501.211(5), 525.532(5) (1965).
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can be presumed not to have intended a result that is absurd,
impossible of execution, or unreasonable, 1 5 the statute should
be construed to avoid such a result. Thus, the proper interpretation of "quantity" would be the alternative posed above, i.e.,
that an interest is indefeasibly fixed as to "quantity" when it is
finally determined that a beneficiary has a particular interest
and that his right to that interest is not subject to condition
precedent or subsequent which would terminate his interest
prior to the end of the maximum potential duration of such
interest. 166
The most difficult problem is that subdivision 5, when read in
connection with any of the above proposed definitions of "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity," would seem to prevent disposition of any interest disclaimed prior to the time when
the beneficiary's interest becomes so fixed. For under subdivision
5, the disposition must be made to those persons who are beneficiaries at the death of the disclaimant, who is deemed to have
died just before the event "which causes him to become finally
ascertained as a beneficiary and his interest to become inde,,17 However,
feasibly fixed both in quality and quantity ....
since he has disclaimed his interest, it would appear that no
event can now make his interest so fixed. Thus, the beneficiaries could never be determined and no disposition of the
interest would ever be possible. This leads to the conclusion that
"indefeasibly fixed in both quality and quantity" must be given
a restrictive meaning to make a beneficiary's interest so fixed
when he becomes finally ascertained as a beneficiary. 68 Otherwise it could not be ascertained who will take in the event of
disclaimer whenever a beneficiary disclaims an interest prior to
the event which causes his interest to become so fixed. 9 This
165. AvNmw. STAT. § 645.17 (1965); First Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner,
250 Minn. 122, 127, 84 N.W.2d 55, 59 (1957); Village of Aurora v. Commissioner, 217 Minn. 64, 72-73, 14 N.W.2d 292, 298-99 (1944).
166. See notes 160-62 supra and accompanying text.
See also In the Matter of Estate of Aylsworth, 74 Ill. App. 2d 375,
219 N.E.2d 779 (1966), where the Illinois Supreme Court, construing
the words "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity" in the Illinois
disclaimer statute, assumed that a present right to the income of a trust
was "indefeasibly fixed" in "quality and quantity" even though the
trustee had the right to withhold such income payment in his discretion.
167. MVnN. STAT. §§ 501.211(5), 525.532(5) (1965). (Emphasis added.)
168. See notes 147-49 supra and accompanying text.
169. Further, it could be contended that unless the phrase is given a
restrictive meaning, any distribution of an interest disclaimed prior to the
time it becomes "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity" would
result in the disclaimant being deemed to have made a transfer subject

1967]

DISCLAIMERS

reasoning leads to the conclusion that all beneficiaries have six
months from the time they become finally ascertained to disclaim
70
their interests.
One further problem with the phrase is worthy of consideration. Its application to a beneficiary possessing the power to
terminate his own interest is not clear. 17 1 If such an interest is
not "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity" within the
meaning of the statute, a tax free disclaimer of such an interest
is allowed at any time prior to its termination. It is submitted
that such a construction would allow disclaimers on an undesirably permissive basis. No justification is apparent for allowing
a person such a long period within which to disclaim on the rationale that his interest is not "indefeasibly fixed both in quality
and quantity" when he has it within his power to remove this
condition from his interest. To avoid such a result, an interest
"indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity" except for conditions whose legal effect is within the control of the beneficiary,
should be deemed "indefeasibly fixed both
in quality and quan72
tity" within the meaning of the statuteY.
Unless the period within which a beneficiary can effectively
disclaim an interest is found to be six months,'7 3 the statute as
drawn leads to many undesirable consequences. Regardless of
how the words are interpreted, the requirement that an interest
be "indefeasibly fixed in both quality and quantity" before the
time period within which a person may effectively disclaim beto the gift tax. On the federal level, it could be argued that since the
person receiving the property did not receive it as the taker in the event
of disclaimer, he must have received it by transfer. Thus, since he did
not receive it through the process created by the original grantor, he
must have received it by a transfer from the disclaimant. Cf. William
L. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
However, on the state level there is another problem. One section
of the disclaimer statute, MmI.
STAT. § 292.031 (1965), provides that a
person disclaiming pursuant to the statute will not be deemed to have
made a transfer for state gift tax purposes. Thus, on the above reasoning it is determined the property was received by transfer and yet
there is no person who could have made the transfer.
170. This effectively writes the words "indefeasibly fixed in both
quality and quantity" out of the statute. Although all words should be
given independent significance whenever possible, this must be done,
if subdivision 5 is interpreted as above, in order to avoid results which
are absurd and impossible of execution. See note 165 supra.
171. An example is where a donee is given a life estate with power
to terminate his estate by the exercise of a power of appointment or a
power to appoint the property by deed to the remaindermen.
172. Cf. Minn. Tax Dept. Gift & Inheritance Tax Regs. § 39(5) (b)
(Proposed Regs. 1967).
173. See note 170 supra and accompanying text.
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gins to run permits disclaimers on a broadly permissive basis.
It is difficult to justify the allowance of a tax free disclaimer
long after the creation of an interest. The justification for
allowing disclaimers tax effect seems to be that it is unjust to
force a man to take something he does not want and then attach
tax liability when the disclaimant does not in fact obtain possession of, or any direct benefit from, the property. 17 4 However,
the liberality of this statute allows a beneficiary much more
than the right to disclaim an interest. He has the benefit of
waiting for a long period to see whether he needs the interest
before deciding whether to disclaim. Thus, he has control over
the property which warrants the imposition of a tax. Yet
this statute allows him the economic security of having the interest at his disposal and also the tax advantage of being able
to eventually disclaim and pass the interest tax free to, in most
instances, the natural objects of his bounty. The adoption of a
set period of time within which to disclaim would allow a beneficiary to disclaim an interest without being subject to a tax; but
it would also prevent him from exercising control over the
interest for a prolonged period of time without being subjected
to a tax on the exercise of such control.
Further, in the absence of a composition agreement 175 finally determining state inheritance taxes payable on the interest,
it is possible that the disclaimant would be in a position to control the state tax result for an unduly long period. If the high
tax is paid, a refund of inheritance taxes would be required if
the inheritance tax on the disclaimed interest, when passing to
the taker in event of disclaimer, were less than the tax liability
originally assessed on the assumption that the disclaimant would
succeed to the interest.176 The state taxing authorities are entitled to some degree of certainty without undue administrative
difficulties and there is no good reason for allowing disclaimers
on such a permissive basis. Therefore, there appears no justification for allowing a person to control inheritance tax consequences for so long a period.
174. See notes 11-13, 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
175. See MhNrN. STAT. § 291.30 (1965), which provides that when the
tax payable is not definite due to some contingency, the taxpayer has
the option of paying the high tax or entering into a final agreement
compromising the rate.
176. Alum. STAT. § 291.11(5) (1965). However, where the taxpayer
enters into a composition agreement, see note 175 supra, and the person
taking, whether or not he is the disclaimant, would be taxed at a higher
rate than that settled upon in the agreement, there is no provision allowing the state to recover the tax lost.
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Moreover, the statute brings Minnesota law into direct conflict with existing federal law as to what constitutes an effective
disclaimer for federal tax purposes. Although there is no well
developed federal doctrine as to what constitutes a reasonable
time within which a person may disclaim, the Minnesota statute
clearly allows beneficiaries, in many instances, to disclaim after
what would be deemed an unreasonable time under federal
law.177 Obviously, the interest in creating uniformity in the
78
law should be given some weight.
C.

CONCLUSIONS

Due to the conspicuous omissions from, and the confusing
language of the legislation, the disclaimer statute creates many
interpretive problems. Since it is unwise and unnecessary to
wait for judicial interpretation of the statute and since certain
objectionable features of the statute should be corrected, amendment of the statute is warranted. These amendments, at the
very least, should make clear what part the common law doctrine
of acceptance plays in relation to the statute and when the six
a disclaimer will be permitted under
month period within which
179
the statute begins to run.
177. See Kathryn S. Fuller, 37 T.C. 147, 155 (1961); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-1(c) (1958) ; notes 42-65 supra and accompanying text.
The "indefeasibly vested" test proposed by the state regulations,
see note 150 supra and accompanying text, also seems to be in conflict
with the federal law. For example, a contingent interest need not be
disclaimed under this test, regardless of whether the beneficiary knows
of the existence of the interest and no matter how long after the creation
of the interest the contingency is removed, until six months after the
removal of such contingency. In many instances, this could be a period
longer than that which would be a reasonable time under the federal
regulation since its time limit begins to run after knowledge of the creation of the interest is acquired.
173. Further, it is possible, due to the tax motivation behind the
statute, that the federal taxing authorities would tend to disregard the
fact that the disclaimer is effective under Minnesota law while applying
a more strict interpretation of what will be deemed a reasonable time or
constitute acceptance within the meaning of the federal regulation. This
would result in according a less favorable treatment to Minnesota residents for federal tax purposes than to citizens of other states. See notes
51-65 supra and accompanying text.
179. For two other problems which seem to warrant attention, see
notes 114-21 supra and accompanying text.
It could be contended that the sections of the statute which provide
that disclaimer under the statute will be effective for state tax purposes
should be repealed to allow a common law development of the tax result of such disclaimers. However, it appears that this would produce
little limitation since the courts would probably find a disclaimer effective under the Minnesota law of property effective for state tax purposes. Further, this would produce some degree of uncertainty as to the
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Proposed amendments to the statute were before the 1967
legislature but failed to pass.18 0 Since these amendments were
sponsored by the Minnesota Gift and Inheritance Tax Division,
they were confined to amending the sections of the statute determining the state tax consequences of a disclaimer. 8 1 They
provided that, regardless of the effectiveness of the disclaimer
under the disclaimer sections, 8 2 there could be no effective disclaimer of an interest for state tax purposes after its acceptance
and that an interest must be disclaimed within eighteen months
83
after the beneficiary learns of the existence of such interest.
These amendments would have clearly alleviated, on the state
level, the major ills created by the statute. They would have
avoided confusion by removing the necessity of having to construe, rationalize, and interpret the statute so as not to arrive at
results which are clearly undesirable.8 4
Even though it seemed desirable to adopt these amendments,
one problem remained. The disclaimer sections were intended
to create an effective disclaimer under local law which would
then be effective for both federal and state tax purposes. It is
questionable whether such a disclahner would have been effective for federal tax purposes when it would be ineffective for
state tax purposes.'8 5 Further, there is no justification for a
state tax consequence of an attempted disclaimer under the statute.
Thus, it seems amendment of the statute is the better solution.
180. Minn. H.F. 868, 870 (1967). Both bills were passed by the
Minnesota House of Representatives March 7, 1967 and were referred to
the Senate Taxes & Tax Laws Committee. However, the bills were
never considered by the Committee.
181. MINN. STAT. §§ 291.11, 292.031 (1965). It is obvious that the
department felt that its function was to police and administer tax laws,
rather than the law of wills, trusts, conveyances, and the like, and thus
confined the amendments to its area of expertise and responsibility.
182. MINN. STAT. §§ 501.211, 525.532 (1965).
183. See ALI FED. GiFT AxD ESTATE TAX PROJECT § Xl (a) at 24-25
(Nov. 1966 Draft), which also suggests that eighteen months be adopted
as the maximum time within which ihe beneficiary of an interest
may disclaim after acquiring knowledge of the interest without being
subject to an additional tax.
184. See notes 173-78 supra and accompanying text.
185. At first glance it would appear that such a disclaimer would
not be ineffective because it did not comply with the local law requirement of the federal regulation. This is so because the regulation requires only that a person be able to refuse to accept ownership of the
interest under local law. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958). There is no
evidence that the local law requirement also means that such disclaimers,
to be effective for federal tax purposes, must be effective for state tax
purposes. However, it seems unlikely that the federal taxing authorities
would look upon a statutory right to disclaim which is ineffective for
state tax purposes with much favor when determining whether it is
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difference between the effectiveness of a disclaimer under the
substantive law of property and under the state tax law when the
purpose of the entire statute was originally tax oriented. Thus,
all sections of the statute should be amended to effectuate consistency.

effective for federal tax purposes. Thus, it appears unlikely that such a
disclaimer would fulfill the federal criteria for an effective disclaimer
for tax purposes. See notes 57-65 supra and accompanying text.

